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My talk will be divided into three parts, First, I will 
briefly describe the conclusions of the much publicized report for the 
Club of Rome: The Limits to Growth. Second, I w�ll describe the model 
employed to make the calculations not so much from a 
technical point of view but to give you a feeling for the reasoning 
involoved. And the last part will point out that though the model is 
extremely naive it nevertheless contains an important germ of truth. 
THEIR CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of The Limits to Growth can be paraphrased 
as follows: The world is headed for a great depression, the likes 
of which will make the 1930s seem like a mild downturn. Not only will 
there be a larger and more prolonged reduction in production and 
employment, but this depression will be accompanied by widespread 
starvation and disease, a large increase in death rates and an eventual 
decline in the world's population, Why is such a depression more or 
less inevitable unless action is taken now to stop population and 
industrial growth? "Exponential growth, u which results in a doubling 
of the world's industrial output every ten years the authors claim, 
cannot be sustained because if we do not exhaust our resources we will 
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kill ourselves with pollution: Furthermore, Meadows and Company claim 
that the negative feedback required to slow down growth to a sustainable 
rate will come too late to avoid a major depression. 
Why will the feedback come too late? As an analogy, think 
of a thermometer as a device for supplying positive and negative feedback 
for putting coal on a fire to keep one's house comfortably warm: when 
the temperature is below sixty degrees, say, the thermometer supplies 
positive feedback for putting more coal on the fire. On the other hand1 when 
the reading is 75 degrees negative feedback is provided, which is to say, 
you already have put too much coal on the fire. But suppose that as 
you put more and more coal on the fire the temperature does not go up 
more or less continuously. You shovel coal on to the fire for an hour 
and it goes up only two degrees, and then within a fifteen-minute 
period, the temperature shoots up to 75 degrees. In this case, you 
receive negative feedback but it comes too late to prevent the house 
from becoming overheated. And the authors assume that the negative 
feedback from growth at exponential rates is something like the negative 
feedback from putting too much coal on the fire. By the time the feedback 
is received the economy is overheated in the sense that it is growing at 
a far greater rate than can be sustained. Consequently a serious 
depression becomes more or less inevitable. 
THE MODEL 
The authors advertise their approach as 11systems dynamics, 11 
A "dynamic system,11 according to their definition is one which is 
capable of responding to both positive and negative feedback, An 
example in terms of their description would be a captain of a ship who 
made short�term predictions on the basis of observing the interaction 
between his ship and the waves; after which he makes corrections1 to 
keep the ship on a prescribed course. Or tv take an0ther 
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example, let us imagine a person has observed that when putting coal on 
the fire there is a delayed response between shoveling the coal and a 
comfortably warm room. And suppose further that the person has adjusted 
his coal shoveling strategy to take into account this observation, If 
we define a "dynamic system" as one which responds to both positive and 
negative feedback then the shrewd coal shoveler, who constructs a theory 
for shoveling coal by observing reality, qualifies as a ndynamic system," 
However, there seems to be some disagreement between MIT 
and Caltech people on how to define 11dynamic behavior." In terms of 
my concept of 11dynamic economics," a system which responds to both 
positive and negative feedback would be called a "cybernetic system" 
but not a dynamic system� In my terms� to qualify as a 
"dynamic system, 11 it is essential to be able to respond to negative 
feedback by discovering alternatives that the person in question simply 
could not have predicted beforehand. For example, let us assume that 
a husband is confronted with a serious matrimonial dilemma: either he 
must discover a more effective way for dealing with his mother-in-law 
or he must find a new wife. And let us further suppose that with 
necessity knocking on his door the husband puts his imagination to 
work to discover an alternative he could not have predicted beforehand. 
Such a husband would qualify as a genuine 11dynamic system, 11 Or to take 
as another example a captain of a ship who makes new discoveries in the 
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face of dealing with unexpected conditions. He, too, can be described as 
a dynamic system, because the essence of dynamic behavior is dealing with 
the unexpected. 
In short, whereas Meadows and Company define dynamics in a 
manner which is compatible with physical reality, I define a dynamic 
system to include a diversity of people with respect to their 11opennesstt 
-- their ability to accept and deal with new circumstances, At the one 
end of the scale are those people whose behavior is strikingly similar 
to a 11closed cybernetic system": because they are quite as predictable 
as computers, such people have an almost zero ability for dealing with 
dilemmas. Most accountants fall in this category, just as do many 
lawyers. At the other end of the scale are people with a high degree 
of 11openness" due to a great capability to engage in dynamic behavior, 
For example, as Mayor of New York, La Guardia did so well when dealing 
with dilemmas that he can be said to have approximated the characteristics 
of a "predictably unpredictable dynamic system." It could never be 
predicted just how he would overcome this or that dilemma, but you could 
bet that in something like four out of five cases he would come up 
with a satisfactory resolution, 
Obviously, "opennesstt not only requires imagination to use 
hints from previous experiences to construct new hypotheses but also a 
sensitivity to negative feedback coupled with a sufficient sense of 
self-confidence to enable actions to be taken on the basis of 
equivocal indicators. In short, the essence of dynamic behavior is that 
it cannot be programmed on a computer. And the fact of the matter is 
that if man were as predictable as the MIT model assumes, he would 
never have escaped from the Stone Age� Man would still be hovering in 
caves while the lions ruled the Earth! 
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PREDICTING THE FUTURE 
Granting that the model of dynamic behavior I subscribe to 
is very different from the Meadows and Company model, how different 
would my predictions of the future be from theirs? By way of introducing 
this topic�. I want to note that without defining "dynamic 
behavior" in the way I have, it would be impossible to explain the 
economic development of the United States, From 1900 to 1950 something 
like 7/8 of our growth occurred as a pure productivity increase and only 
1/8 can be explained in terms of the growth of the conventional inputs: 
land, labor and capital. In other words, 7/8 of our growth came about 
as a result of improvements in the menu of technological alternatives, 
Moreover a better and better menu not only permitted increases in 
productivity in this country, but many others as well, 
This remarkable economic development of the United States 
must be explained in terms of a true dynamic model -- and not a 
cybernetic model. And it simply could not have occurred if American 
entrepreneurs did not have the ability to anticipate shortages of one 
kind or another and to take action upon them before they became serious 
problems for society as a whole. 
In fact competition between highly dynamic firms worked 
so remarkably well in bringing about smooth progress that many economists 
feel there was a more or less automatic hidden hand at work -- a hidden 
hand which will assure more or less automatic progress in the future. 
However, to my way of thinking it is quite as naive to believe in an 
automatic progress model, which assumes heaven on earth, as it is to 
believe in a cybernetics model which assumes that unless man renounces all 
6 
forms of growth, his destiny is hell. 
Why am I somewhat pessimistic about the automatic progress 
model? It is not because I believe there is a shortage of creative 
people in the United States. In the millions of Europeans who chose to 
come here during the 19th century we inherited more than our share of 
risk-takers. Moreover, because personality differences in people are 
in very significant degree genetically determined differences, 
America1·s inheritance of relatively dynamic people can be regarded 
as more or less permanent, 
The problem is that not only America but almost all the 
affluent countries of the world face a shortage of risk-taking -- and 
with it, a low demand for risk-takers. Why is there much less risk­
taking in American business firms than there was, say, ten or fifteen 
years ago? One reason is that the post-World War II industrial 
revolutions, which were the most profound of any in our previous 
history, have slowed down substantially, And with a slowing down in the 
industrial revolutions there has been a marked change in the character 
of American business firms. Suppose that you had observed a firm in 
the chemical, petroleum or aircraft industries twenty years ago and 
you observe the same firm today, What difference in behavior could you 
expect to discover? You would discover in nine cases out of ten the 
difference that for example can be found between a criminal law firm 
and a probate law firm: between a firm which loves to deal with 
uncertainty because the more uncertainty, the more potential alternatives 
it will have to defend its clients versus a firm whose main fear is 
the fear of unpredictability. Associated with this change, we should 
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expect to find firms which are more internally structured and contain less 
trust, and have therefore a lower capacity to engage in dynamic behavior, 
Moreover, just as criminal law firms and probate law firms are composed of 
dissimilar personalities, associated with the change in organizational 
behavior there has been a decided change in the kind of people in 
middle and top management positions. Whereas most of the leaders of 
the post-World War II industrial revolutions were scientists and 
engineers who received their training at the World War II Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, the new people who have taken over 
their positions for the most part were trained as accountants, lawyers 
or business administrators. In other words, the people who rise to the 
top today are trained to perform more or less the same function in 
modern society as did genetic imbreeding in medieval societies: to 
preserve an organization's history rather than make new history, 
To be sure, this is not the first time in American history 
we have faced the prospect of stagnation, Just as Robert Townsend and 
others now describe how business organizations stifle people and 
strangle profits, so were there business leaders in the 1920s who made 
the same charges. And even earler, the fifteen-year period before 
World War I was a period of stagnation a period in which Thorstien 
Veblen observed the same disappearance of entrepreneurship as we are 
observing today. 
However, there is a real difference between the American 
economy today and the economy about which Veblen wrote. In 1920 neither 
the United States' economy nor the world economy were as interdependent 
as they are today. In the past whereas the dynamism of the economy 
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was maintained by adding entirely new products and often new industries, 
under today's circumstances the failure of a few large industries to 
engage in dynamic behavior supplies a major constraint on the dyanmic 
performance of the entire economy. For example, suppose that the 
automobile, electric power and petroleum industries were incapable of 
engaging in any greater degree of dynamic behavior than that in which 
they engage today. If this be the case, and if air quality goals 
continue to be postponed for this reason, then more of the burden for 
dealing with pollution problems simply will have been transmitted from 
industry to the cities, Economic life in Detroit, for example, will 
have been made more predictable at the expense of making progress toward 
better air quality goals in Los Angeles more unpredictable, In the 
case of either pollution problems or problems of material shortages, 
it is impossible for an entire society to conserve its predictability. 
Try to spare this or that activity from change and you will find that 
you have transmitted the burden to someone else, 
Therefore one of my reasons for feeling that progress will 
not be as automatic in the future as it has been in the past is that 
whereas automatic progress requires the talents possessed by criminal 
law firms -- we actually live in an economy presided over by firms 
strongly resembling probate law firms, And another reason has to with 
our newly founded religion in America: the religion of stable growth. 
In the past, the overall stability of the American economy was 
maintained by having entrepreneurs who were willing to take genuine risks 
to engage in unpredictable behavior. For example when Henry Ford the 
First pioneered the Model-T car, he pioneered a concept of automobiles 
for the masses which would have been very difficult to predict. And 
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this action in turn played a significant role in ending the period of 
stagnation which began early in this century. But how does Henry Ford 
the Second respond to the current period of stagnation? He has responded 
by raising the prices of his cars and by asking the government for a 
tax reduction to stimulate automobile sales! 
This change more or less symbolizes the change in attitudes 
brought about by the "stable growth religion, u Under the name of "�tab.le 
growth, 11 the government goes as far as it can to completely stabilize 
the environment of business and union leaders, and in doing so makes the 
American economy more like the British economy: one whose dynamic 
capability is just above zero. 
In summary what I have been saying is this: The Model 
developed for the Club of Rome is completely irrational, because it 
does not take human beings into account. Nevertheless it must be 
recognized that we live today in a highly irrational world composed of a 
raging advertising industry, a ranting legal profession and a lounging 
gentry. And such a society may not have a substantially greater 
dynamic capability than a closed cybernetic system. 
